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Abstract 29 
Sense of agency refers to the experience that links one’s voluntary actions to their external 30 
outcomes. It remains unclear whether this ubiquitous experience is hardwired, arising from 31 
specific signals within the brain’s motor systems, or rather depends on associative learning, 32 
through repeated co-occurrence of voluntary movements and their outcomes. To distinguish 33 
these two models, we asked participants to trigger a tone by a voluntary keypress action. 34 
The voluntary action was always associated with an involuntary movement of the other 35 
hand. We then tested whether the combination of the involuntary movement and tone alone 36 
might now suffice to produce a sense of agency, even when the voluntary action was 37 
omitted. Sense of agency was measured using an implicit marker based on time perception, 38 
namely a shift in the perceived time of the outcome towards the action that caused it. Across 39 
two experiments, repeatedly pairing an involuntary movement with a voluntary action 40 
induced key temporal features of agency, with the outcome now perceived as shifted 41 
towards the involuntary movement. This shift required involuntary movements to have been 42 
previously associated with voluntary actions. We show that some key aspects of agency 43 
may be transferred from voluntary actions to involuntary movements. An internal volitional 44 
signal is required for the primary acquisition of agency, but, with repeated association, the 45 
involuntary movement in itself comes to produce some key temporal features of agency over 46 
the subsequent outcome. This finding may explain how humans can develop an enduring 47 
sense of agency in non-natural cases like brain-machine interfaces. 48 
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Significance Statement 54 
In everyday life, people feel in control of their voluntary actions, and their outcomes. This 55 
‘sense of agency’ could reflect hard-wired brain signals for volition, or could be acquired by 56 
repeated association between a goal-directed action and another event. By pairing voluntary 57 
actions of one hand with involuntary movements of the other hand, we showed that key 58 
aspects of agency experience can transfer from voluntary to involuntary movements. Our 59 
results explain why one can feel fully in control of one’s actions even when they are 60 
performed automatically, without focal conscious attention. We suggest that sense of agency 61 
depends on a metacognitive signal that is relatively non-specific. Our findings could guide 62 
acquisition of voluntary control using neuroprosthetics and brain-machine interfaces. 63 
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\body 78 
Introduction  79 
In a series of brilliant experiments, Roger Sperry switched the nerves for flexion of the rat 80 
hind leg with the nerves for extension. After that, whenever the bottom of the foot was 81 
injured, the rat extended the foot instead of flexing it. Rats never learned to lift up the paw, 82 
and  “no adaptive functioning of the nervous system took place” (1). When the optic nerves 83 
of salamanders were cut, and the eyeball rotated 180 degrees, salamanders saw upside 84 
down for the rest of their lives (2). These experiments suggested that key sensorimotor brain 85 
circuits are largely hardwired, and impervious to modification by experience. 86 
“Sense of agency” refers to the capacity to control one's actions, and, through them, the 87 
external world. Sense of agency is fundamental to instrumental and goal-directed actions, 88 
and forms the cornerstone of humans’ astonishing capacity to change their physical and 89 
social environment (3). However, it remains unclear how the brain produces this distinctive 90 
and important subjective experience. Some recent results have linked the sense of agency 91 
to specific preparatory volitional signals in frontal (4) and/or parietal (5) areas, which then 92 
trigger voluntary motor commands passing through the “final common path” (6) of the 93 
primary motor cortex. Importantly, these ‘volitional signals’ were generated well before the 94 
occurrence of both action and outcome, and were strongly correlated with the subjective 95 
intention to move. Such theories suggest a hard-wired, Sperry-esque account of human 96 
volition.  97 
In contrast, associative theories of agency deny the special status of internal volitional 98 
signals, and focus instead on co-occurrence of actions and outcomes. For example, in 99 
ideomotor theories, repeated association of actions and outcomes means that, over time, 100 
actions come to be represented primarily in terms of their anticipated outcomes or goal-101 
states. By the same association, activation of the neural code for the goal event is then able 102 
to generate the voluntary action (7). Stronger versions of this view suggest that people 103 
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merely infer their own agency based on observing the combination of action and outcome. 104 
There is no direct mental access to the internal processes that cause our actions, and the 105 
experiences of will and agency are mere inferences, or even illusions (8). 106 
Current computational models of motor control, such as the comparator model (9, 10) have 107 
also been used to explain sense of agency. During action execution, efferent signals from 108 
motor areas are compared to predictions about the sensory consequences of the actions, 109 
such as feedback from a moving limb, or from some other external outcome of the action. 110 
These, contain elements of both the hard-wired and the associative frameworks. On the one 111 
hand, the sense of agency could depend necessarily on hard-wired efferent motor signal.  112 
On the other hand, the predictions generated by this signal must be based on learning an 113 
internal model from previous associations between efferent signals and their sensory 114 
consequences, consistent with the associative framework. It remains unclear to what extent 115 
human sense of agency is based on such hardwired signals or on learned associations. 116 
These models make different predictions about the possibility of transferring agency from a 117 
voluntary action to another, co-occurring event. Mental properties commonly transfer from 118 
representation of one event to representations of another, notably in classical conditioning 119 
(11), but it remains unclear whether this occurs also for sense of agency. We asked 120 
participants to trigger a tone by making a voluntary keypress action with one hand. The 121 
voluntary action was always associated with an involuntary movement of the other hand. We 122 
then tested whether the combination of involuntary movement and tone alone might suffice 123 
to produce a sense of agency over the tone, even when no voluntary action was now 124 
present. Theories based on hard-wired efferent signals predict no sense of agency in this 125 
condition, since the putative internal volitional signal for one’s own voluntary actions is, by 126 
definition, absent for involuntary movements. In contrast, associative learning theories 127 
predict that repeated co-occurrence of a voluntary and an involuntary movement could 128 
produce associative transfer, so that involuntary movements could, by association, come to 129 
acquire the same sense of agency that characterises voluntary movements. 130 
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We therefore designed two between-subject experiments. 36 participants were recruited for 131 
the first experiment and were randomly assigned to the experimental and control groups 132 
(Fig.1). In the experimental group, self-paced voluntary keypress actions of the right hand 133 
triggered an immediate and physically-similar involuntary keypress movement of the left 134 
hand, imposed by a robotic arm (Phantom Premium, 3D Systems, South Carolina, USA). 135 
These movements were followed by a tone 250 ms later, in the operant condition. 136 
Participants could thus learn to associate voluntary action, involuntary movement, and tone. 137 
Such “learning” trials alternated with “test” trials containing only involuntary movements 138 
followed by tones, and no voluntary action. Sense of agency over the tone was measured 139 
using an implicit marker based on time perception. Participants judged the time of the tone 140 
using a rotating clock display. A shift in the perceived time of the tone towards the preceding 141 
action, is an established implicit marker of agency. This shift is compared to a baseline 142 
condition containing only a tone, but no action. Importantly, involuntary movements are not 143 
sufficient to cause perceptual shifts of the tone, and a volitional signal appears necessary 144 
(12–14). A further control group of participants also judged the time of the tone following an 145 
involuntary movement, but had never experienced any association between involuntary and 146 
voluntary movement. Kinematics of both hands’ movements were monitored online using 147 
accelerometers. 148 
Experiment 2 used the same design, but triggered involuntary movements by non-invasive 149 
brain stimulation. 36 participants were recruited and were randomly assigned to 150 
experimental and control groups. Self-paced voluntary actions of one hand were now paired 151 
with involuntary twitches of the other hand, caused by transcranial magnetic stimulation 152 
(TMS) over primary motor cortex. These learning trials again alternated with test trials 153 
containing only involuntary TMS-evoked twitches followed by tones. Motor evoked potentials 154 
(MEPs) were recorded from the first dorsal interosseous of the left hand. The control group 155 
also judged the time of the tone following an involuntary twitch, but they had never 156 
experienced any association between the twitch and any voluntary actions. 157 
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If sense of agency depends on a hard-wired efferent signal from the voluntary motor system, 158 
no amount of associative learning should be able to induce key temporal features of 159 
experience of agency for involuntary movements followed by tones, because the necessary 160 
volitional signal is absent in this case. Conversely, if sense of agency is based on 161 
associative learning, and if such associations can transfer from volitional signals to other 162 
events, the repeated association between voluntary action and involuntary movement should 163 
suffice to support some key temporal features of experience of agency over a tone triggered 164 
by involuntary movement. 165 
Results  166 
Experiment 1. Involuntary movement induced by a robotic arm. 36 participants were 167 
randomly assigned to the experimental group (n=18) or the control group (n=18). Data from 168 
four participants were lost due to technical errors, leaving 16 participants in each group. We 169 
already knew, from previous evidence, that the perceived time of a tone shifts towards a 170 
preceding voluntary action, but not an involuntary movement (12). Surprisingly, in the 171 
experimental group, we also found a perceptual shift in the perceived time of the tone 172 
towards the involuntary movements on interleaved test trials occurring in-between truly 173 
voluntary actions (one-sample, t(15)=-4.18, p<0.01, 95% CI [-200, -65]). In the control group, 174 
who never experienced association between voluntary actions and involuntary movements, 175 
the perceived time of the beep did not shift towards the preceding movement (one-sample, 176 
t(15)=-1.46, p=0.17, 95% CI [-89, 17]). Crucially, the tone binding was significantly stronger 177 
in the test trials of the experimental group compared to the control group (t(30) = -2.40, 178 
p=0.02, d=0.85, 95% CI [-179, -14]) (Fig.2, Fig.S1, Fig.S2 and Table S1).  179 
Finally, to confirm that the difference in baseline blocks did not drive the observed effect, 180 
judgement errors from the baseline blocks were compared. No significant difference was 181 
observed between the experimental and the control group (t(30) = -0.03, p=0.97, d=0.01, 182 
95% CI [-44, 43]). 183 
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Experiment 2. Involuntary movement induced by TMS. Experiment 2 aimed to replicate 184 
the first experiment and to explore any potential differences in the central and peripheral 185 
routs of passive movement induction. 36 participants were randomly assigned to the 186 
experimental group (n=18) or to the control group (n=18). Data from two participants were 187 
lost due to technical errors, leaving 17 participants per group. We replicated the core 188 
findings of experiment 1. In the experimental group, associating passive movements with 189 
voluntary actions of the other hand led to the perceptual shift of outcomes towards TMS-190 
induced passive movements (one-sample, t(16)=-3.27, p<0.01, 95% CI [-133, -28]). No tone 191 
binding was observed in the control group (one-sample, t(16)=-0.31, p=0.76, 95% CI [-67, 192 
50]). Direct comparison of the two groups showed a clear trend for stronger binding on test 193 
trials in the experimental group compared to the control group, though with a lower effect 194 
size that in experiment 1 (t(32) = -1.96, p=0.06, d=0.67, 95% CI [-147, 3]) (Fig.2, Fig.S1, 195 
Fig.S2, and Table S2). 196 
Finally, to confirm that the difference in baseline blocks did not drive the observed effect, 197 
judgement errors from the baseline blocks were compared. No significant difference was 198 
observed between the experimental and the control group (t(32)=0.04, p=0.97, d=0.01, 95% 199 
CI [-48, 50]). 200 
Experiment 1&2. To investigate the generality of the effect across experiments, we 201 
performed a 2x2x2 ANOVA with the within subject factor of condition (baseline vs. operant), 202 
between subject factor of experiment (Exp1 vs. Exp2) and the between subject factor of 203 
group (experimental vs. control). The significant interaction between condition and group 204 
(F(1,62)=9.54, p=0.003, η2=0.13) recapitulated previous findings. Post-hoc analysis showed 205 
that the difference in the perceived time of the beep between two groups lays in the operant 206 
condition (t(64)=-2.54, p=0.01, d=0.63, 95% CI [-150, -18]), not the baseline (t(64)=0.01, 207 
p=0.99, d<0.01, 95% CI [-32, 32]). There was no significant main effect of experiment 208 
(F(1,62)=2.67, p=0.11, η2=0.04). Importantly, there was no interaction between the condition 209 
and experiment (F(1,62)=2.12, p=0.15, η2=0.03), group and experiment (F(1,62)=0.10, 210 
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p=0.75, η2<0.01) or condition, experiment and group (F(1,62)=0.20, p=0.66, η2<0.01). This 211 
suggests that the observed effect is a general phenomenon, regardless of the method used 212 
to induce passive movement (Fig. 2 and Fig. S1). 213 
Discussion 214 
‘Intentional binding’ refers to the perceived compression of an interval between voluntary 215 
actions and their sensory consequences. In particular, participants reliably perceive the 216 
sensory consequences of their voluntary actions as happening earlier in time compared to a 217 
baseline condition where the same event occurs without a voluntary action. Importantly, 218 
involuntary movements were reported not to produce the same binding of tones observed 219 
after voluntary actions, but in fact produced a temporal repulsion (12).   220 
Here, we showed, in two separate experiments, that repeatedly pairing an involuntary 221 
movement with a voluntary action can lead to intentional binding with respect to the 222 
involuntary movement. We have used tone binding as an implicit marker of sense of agency. 223 
Specifically, voluntary-involuntary pairing led to tone binding on involuntary movement test 224 
trials where voluntary action was absent. This acquisition of key temporal features of agency 225 
for involuntary movements did not occur in a control group who never made voluntary 226 
actions. Alternative explanations based on increased attention in the voluntary action group 227 
could not explain the pattern of results observed in our data (see supplementary results and 228 
Fig. S4). Thus, voluntary actions are necessary for the emergence of a sense of agency.  229 
However, once a voluntary signal is present, it can be mentally associated with other events, 230 
and spread to produce the distinctive intentional binding feature of volition, but now with 231 
respect to other movements. Our results therefore suggest that some key temporal features 232 
of experience of agency can be transferred by association from truly voluntary actions, to 233 
movements that are, in fact, involuntary, and purely passive. 234 
A path model of agency acquisition 235 
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In our everyday life we perceive our voluntary actions as caused by our intention to produce 236 
a specific outcome. These voluntary actions are often associated with two specific 237 
experiences: The experience of volition reflects the initiation and control of the voluntary 238 
action, and possibly a prediction of the outcome. The experience of agency, in contrast, is 239 
based on attributing the actual outcome back to one’s own triggering action (15) (Fig.3.A). In 240 
our experiment, we reprogrammed the experiences surrounding voluntary action, by making 241 
participants perform two movements at the same time, one voluntary and the other 242 
involuntary (during learning trials). Thus, the intention to initiate the voluntary action was 243 
associated with two movements, one located on each hand (Fig.3.B). Classical intentional 244 
binding predicts that experience of agency arises when there is both a direct relation 245 
between a movement and its outcome (path 2 in Fig.3.C), and also a direct relation between 246 
the movement and the intention which precedes it (path 1 in Fig.3.C). The necessity of path 247 
1 is clear from previous results (12, 14) showing that intentional binding does not occur for 248 
involuntary movements. 249 
In our experimental group, a further path (path 3 in Fig.3.C), similar to path 2, also exists 250 
between the involuntary movement and the outcome. Data from our experimental group 251 
shows that this path can generate some key temporal features of agency, such as intentional 252 
binding. Importantly, comparison with the control group shows that functioning of path 3 253 
strongly depends on its previous association with internal volitional signals (path 1). For the 254 
control group, the involuntary movement was never paired with the voluntary action, and 255 
involuntary movements never showed the key temporal linkage to outcomes. This finding 256 
suggests that a single volitional signal can drive multiple action-outcome relations. As a 257 
result, some key temporal features of agency can arise for movements that are merely 258 
correlated with an intention, but not directly caused by it. This, in turn, suggests that the 259 
relation between intention and sense of agency is not precisely-matched, and is not effector-260 
specific (Fig.3.D).   261 
Can we be mistaken regarding the facts of our own agency? 262 
11 
 
Explicit measures of agency are subject to a number of cognitive biases, and are highly 263 
sensitive to task demands. We therefore advisedly chose an implicit measure of sense of 264 
agency, based on time perception. Synofzik et al. (2008) suggested that sense of agency 265 
comprises two different levels: an implicit ‘feeling of agency’ and an explicit ‘judgement of 266 
agency’ (16). Based on this view, the ‘feeling’ of agency is produced implicitly by low-level 267 
sensorimotor signals. In the rare case that one must explicitly judge one’s own agency, this 268 
low-level feeling of agency provides the primary evidence for the judgement. However, social 269 
contextual cues and other priors can bias such judgements. The intentional binding task 270 
focusses on the non-conceptual feeling of agency. We did not obtain explicit judgements of 271 
agency in this task. As a result, we cannot know whether the involuntary movements of the 272 
experimental group came to feel like “I did that”, but we imagine they did not. 273 
In healthy adults, voluntary and involuntary movements generate quite different experiences 274 
(17), and our brief training was unlikely to suppress this difference. Indeed, most systems of 275 
law are based on a ‘voluntary action condition’, which rigidly assumes a distinct subjective 276 
experience of voluntary action (18). In particular, selection and preparation of action in 277 
frontal motor areas appears essential for a full experience of voluntary control (19). 278 
Nevertheless, our results show that some key features of sense of agency can be 279 
transferred from voluntary to involuntary movements, given appropriate associative learning. 280 
The experience of the tone following involuntary movement acquired some temporal features 281 
of agency, but this does not imply that participants would judge themselves the author of the 282 
tone. Here, we have used implicit measures to show that one key feature of voluntary action, 283 
namely the important ‘goal-directed’ or ‘ideomotor’ feature, by which the experience of action 284 
leads to anticipation of outcomes, can transfer to involuntary movements. Interestingly, 285 
patients with psychosis may have a deluded experience of their own actions. These 286 
frequently involve false positives, such as reporting voluntary control over external events 287 
unrelated to their own actions, such as changing traffic lights, or news events. 288 
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Our results can also be interpreted using an active inference framework (20). Here, 289 
intentions are abstract predictions about likely outcomes, which are Bayes-optimally 290 
combined with sensory evidence about outcomes when this becomes available. Intentional 291 
binding has been modelled as a Bayes-optimal integration of action and outcome (21). Thus, 292 
strong tone binding might arise because intentional actions provide a high-precision prior for 293 
estimating outcomes. We found that pairing a second event, in this case an involuntary 294 
movement, with a high-precision intentional prior results in that event having a similar 295 
influence on outcome perception to the original intentional action. Thus, the structuring 296 
effects of voluntary action on outcome perception may not reflect some unique experiential 297 
quality specific to volition (though see ref. 22), but simply that intentional actions normally 298 
serve as high-precision priors for their outcomes. 299 
Specificity of Internal volitional signals underlying agency acquisition 300 
We conclude that an internal volitional signal is required for the acquisition of sense of 301 
agency. However, after repeated association, the volitional signal is not required for 302 
subsequent expression of key temporal features of agency, such as intentional binding. 303 
Moreover, the putative volitional signal is not highly specific with respect to which agency 304 
relations are established. In our case, volitional signals controlling the right hand lead to 305 
intentional binding for involuntary movements of the left hand. Thus, a range of 306 
movement/outcome pairings may be enabled by co-occurrence with intention. Intentions do 307 
structure subsequent subjective experience, but by means of a loose fit, rather than a tight 308 
prediction about specific muscular movements. Previous studies suggested that the sense of 309 
agency is highly temporally-specific, in that intentions, actions, and outcomes must follow a 310 
predictable temporal sequence (19, 23). However, the content of intention, action and 311 
outcome can be combined arbitrarily without compromising the experience of agency. Our 312 
result suggests that volitional signals have the interesting property of high “latent 313 
associability”: they potentiate the development of any operant relation they co-occur with. 314 
This is consistent with Skinner’s demonstration that animals assume a causal connection 315 
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between an action and a reinforcing stimulus, even when the connection is in fact an 316 
accidental correlation (24). 317 
In our case, the path between volition and agency is not effector-specific, but effector-318 
independent. In particular, our design involved voluntary actions and involuntary movements 319 
assigned to different hands. Our results thus suggest that the contribution of internal 320 
volitional signals to sense of agency is bihemispheric, rather than hemisphere-specific. 321 
Rodent studies showed that mice readily learn to control a robot when arbitrary motor cortex 322 
activity is used to drive the robot dynamics. Learning such intentional neuroprosthetic skills 323 
depends on corticostriatal plasticity (25). Our results likewise show that linking formation of 324 
an intention to an outcome leads to formation of some key temporal features of agency, 325 
even when the means that mediate between intention and outcome are artificial, and even 326 
after the original volitional signal is dropped. These findings may explain how humans can 327 
develop an enduring and successful feeling of agency in cases of non-natural movement like 328 
brain-machine interfaces (26). 329 
Learning one’s own agency 330 
Our experiment suggests that a conjunction of three conditions may be sufficient for sense of 331 
agency. First, an internal volitional signal must be present to provide a general metacognitive 332 
experience of intentional action. Second, some body movement must occur. Third, some 333 
external outcome of the action must occur. We also showed that no specific linkage between 334 
the metacognitive volitional signal and the body movement is necessary. In particular, the 335 
volitional signal need not be present at the same time as the body movement, nor even 336 
relate to the same effector. Thus, the internal volitional signal need not have a hardwired 337 
connection to the motor output system in the manner suggested by Sperry. In our 338 
experiment, it was sufficient that the volitional signal and the body movement had previously 339 
been associated. 340 
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This pattern of results reflects two fundamental features of human voluntary action, which we 341 
call automaticity and flexibility. Automaticity refers to the way that actions which initially 342 
require focussed attention, such as driving a car, or cooking soufflés, become increasingly 343 
fluent with repetition. The subjective experience of action also changes. The action becomes 344 
less central in conscious experience, and instead provides a background ‘buzz’ of 345 
awareness (16). However outcomes are still fully attributed to one’s own agency. Our results 346 
show a similar retention of key temporal features of experience of agency even when our 347 
experimental design deliberately reduced and removed intentional control over the outcome. 348 
Thus, our study can clarify a striking paradox of human action: namely, that one can feel fully 349 
in control of a skilled action such as riding a bicycle, and have a clear sense of agency, yet 350 
have only thin conscious experience of the action itself. 351 
Flexibility refers to the ability of humans and animals to achieve control over goal states 352 
using complex and varying means (27). This perhaps contributes to the astonishing human 353 
proficiency in developing and using technology. Hebb’s classical concept of motor 354 
equivalence (28) suggests that cognitive systems are not generally concerned whether a 355 
goal is achieved with one effector or with another – all movements that achieve the goal are 356 
effectively equivalent.  357 
This transfer of key temporal features of experience of agency from intentional actions to 358 
other movements recalls the way that sense of agency emerges in human development. 359 
Human infants appear to act randomly, with little intentionality and goal-directedness, 360 
compared to healthy adults. During early experience, infants may gradually learn the precise 361 
mapping between different intentions, the resulting body movements, and external 362 
consequences. They thus eventually acquire the capacity to move a specific effector –363 
achieving control over their body, and thus over their environment. Our results show that the 364 
capacity to form new intention-movement-outcome associations seems to remain and, 365 
importantly, could be generalised to non-voluntary movements, even when intentional action 366 
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is no longer present. In this regard, it has been shown that younger children tend to confuse 367 
intended with accidental outcomes (29–31). 368 
Our experiments suggest that a hardwired internal volitional signal is required for the initial 369 
acquisition and emergence of sense agency. Importantly, this hardwired signal appears to 370 
be cognitive rather than motoric, since it is not linked to any specific output effector. At the 371 
same time, associative mechanisms contribute strongly to the expression of sense of 372 
agency. The presence of internal volitional signals during learning (path 1 in Fig.3.C) is 373 
necessary for induction, though not expression of key temporal features of experience for 374 
both direct voluntary action (path 2 in Fig.3.C), and also for an associated involuntary 375 
movements (path 3 in Fig.3.C). 376 
Wittgenstein (17) famously asked “What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up 377 
from the fact that I raise my arm?”. Sense of agency is a partial answer to this question. 378 
However, even simple voluntary actions trigger widespread and automatic involuntary 379 
elements. For example, voluntarily lifting the right arm requires anticipatory compensations 380 
in contralateral muscles (32, 33). Thus, voluntarily moving one effector normally leads to 381 
involuntary (or at least less voluntary) adjustments elsewhere, rather as in our experimental 382 
group. Importantly, people are not generally surprised, or even aware of these involuntary 383 
adjustments – although they would presumably be immediately conscious of a comparable 384 
passive displacement of the same body parts. Thus, the involuntary side-effects of voluntary 385 
action come to form part of an integrated experience of agency (16). The highly distributed, 386 
integrated nature of motor control ensures very frequent association between voluntary 387 
actions and involuntary movement. We suggest this fact lies at the heart of our finding of 388 
extensible sense of agency. 389 
In conclusion, we suggest that some key temporal aspects of experience of agency, namely 390 
the perceptual anticipation of an action outcome, can be transferred from voluntary actions 391 
to involuntary movements. Such transfer follows repeated co-occurrence of an internal 392 
volitional signal, with both an involuntary body movement, and a sensory outcome. 393 
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Importantly, association with an internal volitional signal appears to be necessary to initially 394 
establish key temporal features of agency with respect to an involuntary movement, but is 395 
not necessary for its subsequent expression. The transfer process thus resembles the 396 
development of an enduring sense of agency that emerges during skill learning, as action 397 
control progresses from focussed and effortful to automatic. Interestingly, the involuntary 398 
movement that becomes associated need not match the intention precisely, suggesting that 399 
the metacognitive signals supporting agency acquisition are relatively non-specific. The high 400 
latent associability of these signals may reflect the distributed nature of motor control. 401 
Recent successes in acquisition of voluntary control using neuroprosthetics and brain-402 
machine interfaces testify to the latent associability of human sense of agency. 403 
Materials and Methods 404 
Upon arriving, participants were asked to read the information sheet and fill in the consent 405 
form. In Experiment 1, participants’ left index finger was attached to the distal end of the 406 
robotic arm and was placed on the left control key. The right index finger was placed on the 407 
enter key. The intentional binding task was explained for the participants and they were 408 
familiarised with the robotic arm-induced passive movements. Two accelerometers were 409 
mounted on the left and right index fingers and participants were asked to wear headphones 410 
(Sennheiser, Germany). The experiment started with the baseline block (15 trials). In this 411 
block, participants were instructed to look at a rotating clock but not to press any key. In 412 
each trial, a tone was played and participants judged the clock hand position at the time of 413 
the tone. This block was followed by the operant block, where the tone was always caused 414 
by participants’ keypress at a time of their own free choice, 250 ms later. Like the previous 415 
block, participants were asked to judge the clock hand position at the time of the tone. In the 416 
experimental group, in the first 30 trials of the operant block, voluntary keypresses of the 417 
right hand were paired with the involuntary keypresses of the left hand. These learning trials 418 
were followed by 30 test trials, where a command appeared on the screen and instructed 419 
participants not to make any voluntary keypress with their right hand. Meanwhile, at a 420 
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random time, participants made a passive keypress with their left hand. As in previous trials, 421 
they made judgements about the time of the tone which followed their keypress. These test 422 
trials were interleaved with another 30 learning trials. Therefore, each operant block 423 
consisted of 60 learning trials and 30 test trials. In the control group, participants never made 424 
any voluntary action, therefore, their learning trials only consisted of passive keypress with 425 
the left hand. In both groups, the experiment finished by performing another baseline block. 426 
Experiment 2 followed the same principles as in experiment 1 with the following differences: 427 
Participants were asked to place their left hand on the desk next to the keyboard. Robotic 428 
arm-induced movements of the left index finger were replaced with TMS-induced twitches. 429 
The TMS coil was optimally positioned in each subject to produce involuntary movement of 430 
left index finger, minimising contraction of more proximal muscles and muscles activating 431 
other joints. The headphones were replaced with loud speakers. Accelerometers were 432 
replaced with surface electrodes for electromyography (EMG). As in the previous 433 
experiment, participants made judgements about the time of the beep in three separate 434 
blocks. 435 
Judgement error was calculated by measuring the difference between the judged clock time 436 
and the actual time. The averaged judgement error across the trials was then calculated for 437 
each block. ‘Tone binding’ was defined as the difference between the judgement error in the 438 
operant and the baseline condition. The negative value of tone binding represents the 439 
perceptual shift of outcome toward its action. Tone binding data from the test trials only were 440 
used for analysis. 441 
Experimental design and procedure were approved by the UCL research ethics committee, 442 
and followed the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. Transcranial magnetic stimulation 443 
followed established safety procedures (34). 444 
 445 
 446 
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Figure Legends: 
Figure 1.A. Timeline of an experimental trial. In the learning trials (the left green box), 
participants were instructed to press the enter key on a keyboard in front of them with their 
right index finger at a time of their own free choice. This action was paired with involuntary 
keypress (left control key) induced by a robotic arm pressing on the left index finger. In 
operant blocks, each keypress was followed by a beep (1000 Hz) after 250 ms. At the end of 
the trial, participants reported the perceived time of the beep. See text for full explanation. B. 
In the experimental group, the session started with a baseline block. The operant block then 
ensued. Voluntary actions of one hand were paired with involuntary movements of the other 
hand, followed by a tone 250 ms. After an initial learning phase of 30 trials, further learning 
trials were interleaved with test trials (A. right red box) on which involuntary movements were 
followed by tones, but no voluntary action occurred. The session ended with the execution of 
a further baseline block. C. A group of control participants followed the exact same design as 
the experimental group, but their involuntary movements were never associated with 
voluntary actions. In both groups, data from the test trials (red bold boxes) was used for 
analysis. The corresponding trial number is shown above each box. For Experiment 2, robot-
induced movements were replaced with TMS-induced twitches. 
Figure 2. Tone binding in test trials of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. The dashed line 
indicates the perceived time of the tone in the baseline condition. Binding effects are drawn 
to scale, and values are in ms. Differences in baseline values across sessions have been 
removed for display purposes. See Figure S1 for error bars and Figure S2 for single 
participants’ data. 
Figure 3. A possible mechanism for agency transfer. A. Voluntary actions are often 
associated with subjective experience of volition and agency. B. In our experimental group, 
we rewired this association so that the participants’ intention produces two movements, one 
voluntary and the other involuntary. C. Pairing voluntary and involuntary movements lead to 
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key temporal features of agency being experienced when involuntary movements were 
followed by outcomes (path 3). This experience, however, strongly depended on its previous 
association with intention which precedes the voluntary action (path 1). D. This suggests that 
once a voluntary signal is present, it can be mentally associated with other events, and 
spread to drive key temporal features of agency with respect to other movements. 
 
Supplementary Materials 
Participants. In total 72 healthy volunteers, aged 18-35 years of age, were recruited from 
the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience subject data pool for separate experiments. All 
participants were right handed, had normal or corrected to normal vision, had no history or 
family history of seizure, epilepsy or any neurologic or psychiatric disorder and did not have 
any metallic or electronic object in the head. Participants affirmed that they had not 
participated in any brain stimulation experiment in the last 48 h, nor had consumed alcohol in 
the last 24 h. Participants were paid an institution-approved amount for participating in each 
session of the experiment. 
Intentional binding. We used intentional binding paradigm as an implicit measure of 
agency. The task was based on previous studies (12), and was programmed in LabVIEW 
2012 (Austin, Texas). Participants viewed a clock hand rotating on a computer screen which 
was located 60cm in front of the participants in a quiet room. The initial clock position was 
random. Clock rotation was initiated by participants pressing the return key on a keyboard. 
Each full rotation lasted 2560 ms. Participants were instructed to look at the centre of the 
clock. Depending on the trial, they made voluntary keypress by pressing the enter key with 
their right index finger or made involuntary keypress by pressing the left control key with their 
left index finger (Experiment 1). Participants chose for themselves when to make the 
voluntary actions. After each key press, the clock hand stopped at a random location, 
participants made a time judgement according to condition (see later). Each experimental 
session consisted of two conditions, presented in separate blocks. At the beginning of each 
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block, brief instructions for the relevant condition were displayed on the screen. In the 
baseline condition, participants were instructed to look at the clock but not to press any key. 
While the clock was rotating, a pure tone (1000 Hz, 100 ms duration) was played over the 
headphones (or a loudspeaker in the TMS experiment), 1750-4000 ms (at random) after the 
onset of the trial. Participants were then asked to judge the clock hand position at the time of 
the tone. In the operant condition, participants pressed the key at a time of their own 
choosing, or made an involuntary movement (depending on the trial). Each keypress (or 
movement) produced a tone after 250 ms. Participants had to judge the clock hand position 
at the time of the tone. Baseline condition was tested in two separate blocks of 15 trials, at 
the beginning and end of the experiment. Operant condition was tested in a single block of 
90 trials between the two baseline blocks. 
Haptic device. For Experiment 1, Phantom Premium 1.5 haptic device (3D Systems, South 
Carolina, USA) was used to induce involuntary movements in participants’ left index finger. 
This high-precision device has 3 degrees of freedom and provides a range of motion 
approximating hand movement pivoting at the elbow. Distal phalanx of the participant’s’ left 
index finger was attached to the distal end of the device. Matlab 2014 (MathWorks, USA) 
was used to communicate with the device. The following specifications were used to induce 
a natural-looking passive keypress in the finger: Force direction = X:0/ Y:-1/ Z:0, force 
amplitude = 0.7 N, duration of downward movement = 200 ms (30 ms to taper), duration of 
upward movement = 200 ms (30 ms to taper). To block out the noise of the device at the 
time of force induction, the main body was shielded in a soundproof box and only the arm 
was left out through a small hole. To control for the similarity of the movements across the 
fingers, two accelerometers were mounted on the left and right index fingers of the 
participants. The kinematics of the movement were monitored by the experimenter. We 
measured the exact time interval between the beginning of the voluntary action and 
involuntary movement in the learning trials by using data from accelerometers placed on the 
index fingers of the left and right hand. Analysis of 10 trials selected at random showed that 
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it took 34 ms (± 4 ms sd) between the software command being sent to the robot and the left 
finger actually moving, due to the mechanical delays in the robot. Importantly, these delays 
are present in both learning and test trials, and in both the experimental and the control 
groups. The only difference between trial types is the use of a voluntary keypress to initiate 
the software command to the robot in the voluntary trials of the experimental group - the 
delay between the depression of the key and the initiation of the software command was 2 
ms, and was consistent across 10 trials selected for analysis. 
TMS and MEP measurement. For Experiment 2, transcranial magnetic stimulation was 
delivered with a Magstim 200 stimulator (Whitland, UK). The optimal location for producing 
twitches (Motor evoked potentials (MEPs)) in the left first dorsal interosseous (1DI) was 
located by systematically exploring a 1-cm grid over the hand area of the right motor cortex. 
The motor threshold was calculated for each subject by reducing stimulator output in 5% 
steps to find the lowest level at which 3 MEPs exceeding 50 V peak amplitude were 
obtained from 5 successive stimulations of the relaxed 1DI. Thresholds ranged from 35% to 
60% of stimulator output (mean 45%). TMS output in the experiment was set at 120% of 
relaxed threshold. EMG was measured from the 1DI of the left and right hand with bipolar 
recording from surface Ag/AgCl electrodes. These data were amplified and digitized at 2 kHz 
(CED 1902, Cambridge, UK). 
Supplementary Results 
Motor evoked potentials. Any difference in amplitude of TMS-induced twitches of the left 
index finger between the experimental and control group could influence tone binding. To 
rule out any such possibility, MEP amplitudes were compared between the two groups. No 
significant difference was observed between peak-to-peak amplitudes of MEPs in the test 
trials (t(31) = 0.54, p=0.60, d=0.19, 95% CI [-0.40, 0.69]) or in the learning trials (t(31)=-0.77, 
p=0.45, d=0.27, 95% CI [-0.68, 0.31]: Fig. S3) (MEP data from one subject was unavailable 
due to technical error). These results also exclude the possibility that participants could have 
produced some voluntary motor drive, however modest, in test trials – since even a minimal 
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voluntary motor command, or a ‘motor image’, would be expected to increase corticospinal 
excitability (35, 36). 
Standard deviation across trials. Could the stronger intentional binding in the experimental 
groups reflect a confounding effect of attention? For example, when subjects perform a 
voluntary action, they may direct attention to that action. Any other associated event might 
benefit from these effects, leading to stronger perceptual learning in the experimental group 
than in the control group who made no voluntary actions. Such attention-enhanced 
perceptual learning should lead to improved time estimation for the experimental group. In 
fact, we found an increased bias in judgment, corresponding to stronger tone binding, in the 
experimental group than in the control group.  
In addition, we used the standard deviation of judgement errors across trials for each 
participant to calculate variable error, which is inversely related to the precision of temporal 
estimation of the tone. Improved attention to the tone would predict lower standard 
deviations for the voluntary group. Standard deviation of judgement errors across trials was 
compared in a 2x2x2 ANOVA with the within subject factor of trial type (baseline vs. test), 
between subject factor of group (experimental vs. control) and the between subject factor of 
experiment (experiment 1 vs. experiment 2). Standard deviation across trials was higher in 
test trials compared to baseline trials (F(1,62)=36.61, p<0.01), presumably reflecting the 
attentional effects of the more complex sequence of events in test conditions, particularly the 
co-occurrence of involuntary movement. We found no significant main effect of group 
(F(1,62)=0.17, p=0.68), or experiment (F(1,62)=2.01, p=0.16). Importantly, we found no 
significant interaction between trial and group (F(1,62)<0.01, p=0.95), trial and experiment 
(F(1,62)=0.10, p=0.75), or group and experiment (F(1,62)<0.01, p=0.98), and no significant 
interaction between trial, group and experiment (F(1,62)=0.33, p=0.57). Thus, we found no 
evidence that the experimental group had improved attention to the tone on test trials (see 
Fig. S4). 
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Supplementary figure legends 
Figure S1. The perceived time of the tone (judgement error in ms) is shown in a baseline 
condition, where neither action nor involuntary movement occur, and in the involuntary 
movement test trials for the control and experimental groups. The difference between 
baseline and movement trials is an estimate of shift in the perceived time of the tone due to 
the preceding movement (grey bars). This “tone binding” effect serves as an implicit marker 
of sense of agency. Note inverted Y axis. Error bars show standard error of the mean. The 
mean (and standard error across participants) for all groups and experiments is presented in 
a table below the figure. 
Figure S2. Tone binding in Experiment 1 (A) and Experiment 2 (B) for single participants in 
the experimental and control groups. 
Figure S3. MEPs in the experimental and control groups, presented separately for the 
learning and test trials. No significant effects were observed. Error bars show standard error 
of the mean. 
Figure S4. Standard deviation of tone judgement error across trials. Mean across 
participants of SD across trials is shown separately for baseline and involuntary movement 
test trials, and for experimental and control groups of experiment 1 (A) and experiment 2 (B). 
All values are in ms. Error bars show standard error across participants of the mean. 
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